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Board of Education v. Taxman:
The Unpublished Opinions
INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 1997 the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Board of Education v. Taxman1 to review a judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That
court had ruled, en banc, that the school board in Piscataway, New
Jersey violated Title V112 when it chose to lay off Sharon Taxman,
a teacher at Piscataway High School, rather than Debra Williams,
her colleague. 3 The Board determined that the two teachers were
equal in all other relevant respects; it laid off Taxman, who is
White, rather than Williams, who is Black, in the interests of racial diversity among the faculty. An 8-4 majority of the Third Circuit concluded, as had the district court, that the Board's asserted
interest in racial diversity was not sufficient to overcome the antidiscrimination principle of Title VII, particularly where the
Board used race to decide which of two tenured teachers to dis4
charge, as opposed to which of two qualified applicants to hire.
Taxman quickly became the most anticipated decision of the
Term. Only twice before, in 1979 and 1987, had the Supreme
Court considered the scope of permissible affirmative action under
Title VII. 5 Moreover, the affirmative action issue had crept back
into the national consciousness. In June of 1995 the Supreme
Court held in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,6 that federal
programs granting race-based preferences were subject to strict
scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment. The Adarand decision set
off a comprehensive compliance review of federal affirmative action
1.

117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1998).
3. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
4. See id.; United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 851 (D.N.J.
1993).
5. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
6. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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programs. 7 In November 1996 California's voters passed Proposition 209, which prohibited affirmative action in public employment
there.8 Earlier in 1996 the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas9
that the University of Texas Law School violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by making race-conscious admission decisions for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body.l 0 Many viewed Hopwood as calling into question practices assumed to be lawful under
the Supreme Court's decision almost thirty years before in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke."
Taxman looked like it had the potential to be the Hopwood of
employment by declaring that popular employment practices intended to increase workplace diversity were unlawful. For example, after completing its review of federal employment practices
after Adarand, the Department of Justice had assured federal
agencies that they could make race-conscious employment decisions to "assure that decisionmakers will be exposed to the great12
est possible diversity of perspectives."
Likewise, firms in the private sector are increasingly taking
steps to increase the numbers of women and minorities in their
work forces in order to reap supposed competitive advantages. Diversity programs are becoming popular among major U.S. employers, for whom it is almost an axiom that "our diversity is our
strength. "13 IBM has a "vice-president of global work force diversity."1 4 He has explained that the company's view of increasing job

opportunities for women and minorities is no longer based solely
7. See Ann Devroy, Reno to Issue Policy Guidelines for FederalAffirmative
Action Programs,Wash. Post, June 23, 1995, at Al, availablein 1995 WL 2100020.
8. California Voters Approve Proposition to End State Affirmative Action
Programs, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 216, at D-21 (Nov. 6, 1996).
9. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
10. See id. at 962.
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A recent study of admissions practices at "elite" colleges concludes "that their affirmative action policies created the backbone of the
black middle class and taught white classmates the value of integration." Ethan
Bronner, Study Strongly Supports Affirmative Action in Admissions to Elite Colleges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1998, Metro, at B10, available in 1998 WL 5425812.
12. Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, Post-Adarand Guidance on
Affirmative Action in FederalEmployment (February 29, 1996), reprinted in 1996
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at D-31 (March 5, 1996).
13. Frederick R. Lynch, Clinton Dabbles in Diversity, Tampa Trib., July 2,
1997, Nation/World, at 11, available in 1997 WL 10795334.
14. Tim Green, Keeping Current at IBM; Diversity:A Moral and Strategic Imperative, Chi. Trib., Aug. 9, 1998, Jobs, at 21, available in 1998 WL 2883890.

19981

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

on a "moral imperative" but on a "strategic imperative" because
diversity is inextricably linked to the success of the business. 15
Rather than taking steps to increase the representation of women
and minorities in their work forces to redress previous discrimination, employers are increasingly asserting the right to make race
and sex-conscious decisions to reap the competitive advantages associated with a more diverse work force. The Court's decision in
Taxman had the potential to determine the future of these
practices.
And if these issues were not enough to attract attention, the
facts of the case were compelling. Adarand, the Supreme Court's
most recent affirmative action case, involved the legality of complicated incentive clauses in federal highway construction contracts,
and the Justices sparred over whether strict scrutiny or intermediate-level scrutiny should be applied by courts reviewing such programs. By contrast, Taxman involved two tenured teachers who
had equally compelling claims to continued employment. One was
fired, one was retained, and the employer used race as the tiebreaker. As Judge Sloviter wrote in her dissent in the Third Circuit, "[tihe posture in which the legal issue in this case is presented
is so stripped of extraneous factors that it could well serve as the
question for a law school moot court." 16
However, the case settled in November 1997 before argument, 17 so the issues it raised are unresolved. Because of the high
profile of the case much has been said and written about it, and it
is not our intention to rehash those discussions. Rather, what we
hope to do here is add a new perspective by focusing in detail on
the doctrinal issues that would have faced the Court if the case had
not been settled. By placing ourselves in the shoes of the Justices
we hoped to gain a better appreciation of the likely outcome of the
case in light of the language and intent of Title VII as well as the
Court's prior precedents interpreting Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.
The format is thus somewhat unusual for a law review. Two
mock opinions follow. The first represents Professor McGinley's
15. Id.
16. Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1568 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sloviter,
C.J., dissenting).
17. See Joan Biskupic, Rights Groups Pay to Settle Bias Case, Wash. Post,
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 14714386.
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best estimate, having read the briefs and the record, of what the
Court would have said had it reversed the Third Circuit. The second is Professor Yelnosky's best estimate of what the Court would
have said had it affirmed. With the indulgence of the editors of the
Roger Williams University Law Review we have deviated from the
Bluebook in favor of a citation style more consistent with that
found in Supreme Court opinions. Each opinion is preceded by a
foreword in which the author discusses the issues confronted and
the decisions made in "resolving" the case. We hope this exercise
helps illuminate important issues that will undoubtedly be
presented to the Court sometime in the future.
Ann C. McGinley
Michael J. Yelnosky

